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On March 19, 2013, the Supreme Court issued its highly anticipated'
decision in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. At issue was the geo-
graphic scope of copyright law' s first-sale doctrine. Historically, this doc-
trine has functioned as a significant limitation on the rights of copyright
holders by allowing lawful owners of copyrighted works to distribute them
without violating a copyright holder's exclusive distribution right.3
Significantly, the Court held six to three that the first-sale doctrine al-
lows importing physical books, lawfully made and acquired abroad, into the
United States for resale without violating a copyright owner's distribution
right.4 The Court previously held in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v.
L'anza Research International, Inc. that first-sale rights allow for copy-
righted works originally and lawfully made in the United States to be reim-
ported,5 and in Kirtsaeng the Court completed the circle. In short, the first-
*Visiting Assistant Professor and Shughart Scholar, Penn State Law. I express particu-
lar gratitude to Chris Walker for helpful comments on earlier drafts, the Stanford Law Re-
view Online team for their insightful comments and excellent editing throughout, and my
ever supportive wife and not-so-supportive two boys.
1. Commentators, for instance, analyzed the significant issues in the case prior to the
decision. See, e.g., Guy A. Rub, The Economics ofKirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.:
The Efficiency of a Balanced Approach to the First Sale Doctrine, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. RES
GESTAE 41, 44-47 (2013) (assessing the potential economic effects of the ruling, including
the possible detriment to copyright owners as they lose the ability to price discriminate and
the potential chilling of valuable secondary markets).
2. 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
3. Without the first-sale doctrine, for instance, library lending, gifting of books and
CDs, video rentals, and other secondary markets for copyrighted works would violate a cop-
yright holder's exclusive distribution right.
4. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1357, 1371.
5. 523 U.S. 135, 138-40, 154 (1998).
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sale doctrine includes no geographic limitations, so long as the copyrighted
work was lawfully made somewhere.6
Many have lauded the Court's decision as a significant pro-consumer
decision, but how significant will Kirtsaeng prove? After all, more and
more copyrighted works have moved into digital format, and the pace of
digitization is only accelerating. And in that context, copyright holders can
more easily argue that first-sale rights do not apply because the recipient of
the copyrighted work is merely a "licensee" of the work, not an "owner."
Furthermore, some courts have recently held that first-sale rights do not ap-
ply to transfers of digital works when the transferred file is a copy of the
original one, which is generally the case since the transferred file resides on
a different hard drive than the original." Consequently, while Kirtsaeng may
be a step in the right direction, its ultimate effect in the increasingly im-
portant digital context relies on resolving these issues in a manner that pre-
serves first-sale rights rather than eviscerates them.
This Essay argues that the history and purpose of the first-sale doctrine
provide good reasons to abandon the licensee/owner dichotomy as well as
the formalistic approach to interpreting the doctrine's applicability to digital
transfers. Doing so, furthermore, is unlikely to undermine markets for copy-
righted works, but instead will help preserve the appropriate balance be-
tween the rights of copyright holders and consumers that first-sale rights
have historically helped maintain.
THE LICENSEE VERSUS OWNER CONUNDRUM
Federal courts have held that when a recipient of a copyrighted work is
a "licensee" and not an "owner" of a copy of the work, first-sale rights do
not apply.9 In such cases, copyright holders can prevent any subsequent dis-
tribution of the copyrighted work, including by way of importation.
What are the key factors in determining whether someone is a "licen-
see" or an "owner?" Different circuits employ a variety of tests to answer
this question. But one important variant is reflected in the Ninth Circuit's
approach, which was elaborated on in a series of cases in 2010. According
to the Ninth Circuit, one significant factor, ironically, is simply whether the
6. Consequently, a native of Thailand studying in the United States who profited from
textbook arbitrage was not liable for copyright infringement. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1358.
7. See, e.g., Joe Mullin, Supreme Court Upholds First-Sale Doctrine in Textbook Resale
Case, ARs TECHNICA (Mar. 19, 2013, 8:44 AM PDT), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2013 /03 /thai-student-protected-by-first-sale-supreme-court-rules.
8. See, e.g., Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., No. 12 Civ. 95(RJS), 2013 WL
1286134, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2013).
9. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2010). For an
overview of the variety of approaches courts have taken to making this determination, see
Brian W. Carver, Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy Ownership: First Sales
and Essential Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1887 (2010).
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copyright holder labels the agreement with the purchaser a license agree-
ment.10 The other two factors concern whether the copyright holder imposes
(1) significant restrictions on the recipient's ability to transfer the copy-
righted work, and (2) other notable use restrictions." In other words, a cop-
yright owner can eliminate first-sale rights by specifying, essentially, that
they do not apply.
Doing so becomes increasingly simple with the digitization of copy-
righted works. With physical products it may be more difficult to impose
such terms on users.1 2 But with digital content there is no such difficulty.
Consequently, eliminating first-sale rights-including the effects of the
Kirtsaeng decision- is generally only a clickthrough agreement away.
But courts err in focusing on the licensee/owner distinction. First, pur-
chasers of copyrighted works are by definition licensees of the copyright in
the work. They do not become, by virtue of the purchase, owners of the
copyright in the work or even licensees of all the rights available under
copyright. A purchase constitutes a limited license to use the work for per-
sonal benefit, subject to statutory exceptions such as fair use and first-sale
rights.
Consequently, the strained legal analysis that focuses on determining
whether someone is a "licensee" or an "owner" is a moot point. It has al-
ready been answered. It then becomes all the more illogical that a copyright
holder, by designating purchasers as licensees and restricting them from
transferring the work, can eliminate first-sale rights and the effects of
Kirtsaeng.
This seems even clearer when considering certain exceptions to first-
sale rights specified in the Copyright Act. For instance, despite first-sale
rights, purchasers of software or phonorecords cannot rent either to subse-
quent parties. 13 The obvious concern underlying these exceptions is that
10. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1110.
11. Some "notable use restrictions" that the Ninth Circuit referenced include "limit[ing]
user[s] to making one working and one backup copy of the" copyrighted work; forbidding
"examination, disclosure, copying, modification, adaptation, and visual display" of the work;
"prohibit[ing] ... duplication and third-party use"; limiting use to a single computer; "pro-
hibit[ing] multicomputer and multi-user arrangements] and permit[ing] transfer to another
computer no more than once every thirty days." Id. at 1110, 1111 & n. 11.
12. For instance, courts have found that placing such terms inside a book cover or in-
cluding them on a CD sent to consumers without solicitation did not result in binding terms
on the consumers. See, e.g., Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908) (hold-
ing that a copyright owner's inclusion of restrictive conditions on the inside flap of its book
were not binding because no contract had formed between the purchaser and the copyright
owner); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding
that restrictive conditions included with promotional CDs sent to consumers were not bind-
ing on the consumers because under all circumstances of the CDs' distribution, the consum-
ers were free to do with the CDs as they wished and no consensual license agreement had
been entered into).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (2011).
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with the widespread availability of copying technology, renters could easily
copy these media and thereby undermine the copyrighted works' market.
But these exceptions are unnecessary if the same result could have been
achieved by relying on the licensee/owner distinction. One might argue that,
historically, it was more difficult to render someone a licensee because
software and phonorecords were distributed as physical products. And so
one logical interpretation is that Congress provided the exceptions because
limiting a consumer' s rights through binding terms was difficult.
But elements of the first-sale doctrine's legislative history suggest oth-
erwise. For instance, the House Report to the 1976 Copyright Act specifies
that the first-sale doctrine does not mean that copyright holders cannot im-
pose conditions on the future disposition of their copyrighted works, but it
does mean that violation of those conditions is a breach of contract rather
than a copyright violation. 14 In short, first-sale rights were meant to limit
copyright outright; copyright owners should not be able to circumvent them
through semantics. And because of this prohibition against circumventing
first-sale rights through contract, the specific software and phonorecord ex-
ceptions were provided. Otherwise, the recipient of software or
phonorecords could still distribute either by renting them without violating
copyright law, even if doing so was a breach of contract.
To some extent, the statute mandates the licensee/owner analysis. After
all, the statute indicates that first-sale rights only apply to "owners" of a
copy of a copyrighted work. 15 But for all intents and purposes, purchasers of
digital works "own" their copies of the work, regardless of what the license
agreement may say. Purchasers are generally not expected to return the
works, and in most cases there is no expectation of recurring payments for
continued access. The examples of non-ownership listed in the statute all
envision only temporary possession of the work. This line of reasoning-
where the focus is on the realities of possession rather than semantics of the
license agreement-shows up other circuits, 1 6 as well as in Europe.17 And
this is the line of reasoning that the Supreme Court and Congress should
adopt. Otherwise, a historically important limitation on copyright-as bol-
stered by Kirtsaeng -will likely become history.
14. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 79 (1976).
15. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). The statute later specifically indicates that leasing, lending, rent-
ing, or providing a copy of the work to users in any way such that the user does not "own"
the copy means that first-sale rights are inapplicable. Id. § 109(d).
16. See, e.g., Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2005).
17. Cf. Claus Firber & Ralf Weisser, McDermott Will & Emery, CJEU Rules First Sale
Doctrine Applies to Digital Copies of Software in Europe, JD SUPRA LAW NEws (July 16,
2012), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/cjeu-rules-first-sale-doctrine-applies-t-32547 (not-
ing that there is still uncertainty as to the status of the first-sale doctrine with regards to cer-
tain subscription models of software distribution).
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DIGITALLY TRANSFERRING FIRST-SALE RIGHTS AWAY
Some courts have also recently held that first-sale rights do not apply to
digital transfers of copyrighted works because the transferred file does not
bear the same properties as the original file. " In essence, such courts reason
that because the transferred file is fixed on a different hard drive, the trans-
ferred file is a new copy of the original file, not the original file itself. And
first-sale rights only apply to the original. 19
But such a conclusion defies the simple purpose of the first-sale doc-
trine, which is to allow an owner of a work to transfer it. If such a transfer
can occur while also ensuring that the original owner does not retain his
copy, good reasons for eliminating first-sale rights in the digital transfer
context vanish.
To analogize to the physical world: concluding that first-sale rights do
not apply if the work can be accessed from somewhere other than the origi-
nal purchaser's home would seem absurd to most. But that is precisely the
effect of a formalistic interpretation of the first-sale doctrine's statutory text
in the digital transfer context. Such an interpretation thus effectively elimi-
nates first-sale rights-including the effects of Kirtsaeng-for much digital
content.
THE EFFECTS OF A DIGITAL FIRST-SALE RIGHT
If courts abandoned the licensee/owner distinction and accepted first-
sale rights for digital transfers, would the sky fall on copyright holders?
There are certainly significant issues to consider. For instance, the ease with
which copies can be made and retained, all without degradation, may mean
that digital first-sale rights would lead to increased piracy and thereby un-
dermine markets for copyrighted works. Furthermore, a digital first-sale
right may prevent copyright holders from being able to price discriminate in
different jurisdictions. Consequently, consumers -particularly, perhaps, in
poorer countries-may suffer as copyright holders raise prices in order to
compensate both for increased piracy and an inability to price discriminate.
And society may suffer as copyright holders lose their incentives to create
at all.
But each of these issues is addressable. First, the Copyright Act does
not guarantee copyright holders a right to price discriminate. And preserv-
ing such a benefit at the expense of a statutorily enshrined limitation, with
18. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
19. The legislative history of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act supports this inter-
pretation of the Copyright Act. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONG., DMCA
SECTION 104 REPORT 22-24 (2001) (discussing the legislative history of the Digital Millenni-
um Copyright Act).
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its "impeccable historic pedigree,'20 is unjustified. The same issue was rele-
vant in Kirtsaeng. Presumably, the majority believed that copyright hold-
ers would continue to find ways to effectively monetize their works as they
have done, for instance, in the domestic marketplace. Price discrimination
may enable copyright holders to obtain higher revenues than they otherwise
would. But the primary purpose of copyright is to enrich society, not copy-
right holders.
But will copyright holders continue to enrich society with their works if
a digital first-sale right were reality? If history is any guide, the answer is
yes. Copyright holders have raised the specter of technology gutting their
markets with each new innovation. But often the new technology has actu-
ally proved a boon for them.2 2
In the case of digital first-sale rights, copyright holders would almost
certainly respond by working with device manufacturers to ensure that
when a file is transferred, it no longer resides with the transferor. Certainly
some cases of piracy would still occur-as they do today when consumers
burn their CDs onto their devices before giving the CDs away-but the pos-
sibility of piracy in the physical world has never been justification enough
to eliminate first-sale rights there. Nor should it be in the digital world.
A digital first-sale doctrine might also reduce piracy as consumers rely
on legitimate secondary markets instead of piracy. Secondary markets
might also result in increased sales of other copyrighted works because sec-
ondary markets expose consumers to a broader spectrum of copyrighted
works, which often leads them to purchase complementary goods.23
Last, some argue that the lack of degradation in digital works and the
ease of transferring them should make first-sale rights inapplicable to such
works. But it is hard to see why. The first-sale doctrine does not require that
physical books be tattered before the doctrine applies. Neither does it re-
quire that access to such works include significant barriers; anyone can buy
a new CD or book today and give it to the first person she sees. It might be
argued that eventually such physical products wear away, and so the doc-
trine implies some limitation on the number of transfers. But that is an ar-
20. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013).
21. See id. at 1374 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
22. For instance, copyright holders argued when the VCR first came to market that it
would undermine their ability to generate revenues. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 459 (1984). Instead, sales of cassette tapes provided them with
significant new sources of revenue. See R. Anthony Reese, The Problems of Judging Young
Technologies: A Comment on Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, 55 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 877, 884 (2005).
23. There is some evidence, for instance, that those who illegally download music via
peer-to-peer networks purchase significantly more music than the average consumer. See,




gument for adjusting first-sale rights in the digital context, not eliminating
them altogether.
CONCLUSION
The Kirtsaeng decision helped further cement the first-sale doctrine as
an important limitation on the rights of copyright holders. But more cement
is needed. Specifically, as the digitization of copyrighted works increases,
first-sale rights face increasing peril as copyright holders subject consumers
to click-through agreements that eviscerate first-sale rights in effect if not in
theory. Furthermore, some courts have recently employed a formalistic ap-
proach to the statutory text that renders first-sale rights simply inapplicable
to digital transfers. If Kirtsaeng is to avoid becoming the first-sale doc-
trine's "swan song," courts and Congress must respond to save it.
Doing so will help maintain the proper balance between the rights of
consumers and copyright holders that is vital to a just copyright law. Con-
cerns about increased piracy and undermining creative incentives are cer-
tainly legitimate. But history suggests copyright holders are up to the task
and may, in fact, benefit both themselves and consumers by performing it.
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